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This thesis first introduces Securities Investment Fund’s conception, characters 
and classification. After introducing the basic theory of Securities Investment Fund, 
the writer discusses the legal status of fund manager. In author’s opinion, the 
relationship between fund manager and fund holder is clientage. The contract which 
they signed is a commission contract. Because of the clientage, fund manager hold 
loyalty duty for fund holders to protect their interest. At last, author research the 
loyalty duty of fund manager which include principle transaction of fund manager, 
personal transaction of portfolio manager and fund management fee by introducing 
the legislation of United States, Japan, Hongkong and Taiwan which relate to fund 
manager’s loyalty duty. Among these three aspects, principle transaction of fund 
manager has deepest hazard and must be regulated stricter than other country in China. 
It reflects two sides. The one is common prohibition on principle transaction of fund 
manager and stricter applicable status of duty exemption. The other side is that the 
confinement of affiliated person should be extensive. The writer explores the 
regulation about legal duty and other system about fund managers’ principle 
transaction. Portfolio managers take charge of investment of fund asset directly. Their 
personal transactions have high moral risk. The theoretic basic about the regulation of 
portfolio managers’ personal transaction can be found from Tort Law and Company 
Law. Chinese legislation should prohibit it absolutely and regulate the standard of 
information disclosure more detailedly. Chinese system of fund management fee is 
lack of enough impetus to improve fund managers exert their faculty and is easy to 
lead fund managers to operate illegally. It is necessary to fetch in performance fee 
system to China. A combination of fixed fee and performance fee and a good 
supervision in fund management fee will develop Chinese Securities Investment 
Fund’s market. 
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前   言  1
  
前  言 
 




2005 年短短的七年时间里，我国证券投资基金资产总规模已经超过了 5000 亿人
民币。中国证监会主席尚福林在“第四届中国证券投资基金国际论坛”上透露，截
至 2005 年 11 月 28 日，我国证券投资基金资产总规模达 5008.2 亿份，基金管理
公司数量达到 52 家，其中中外合资基金管理公司 20 家，我国基金业取得了超常
规的快速发展。①在这七年中，证券投资基金发展的速度越来越快：刚开始试点
的 1998 年，只有 5 只基金，净值 107.4 亿元。一直到 2002 年 8 月，基金资产才
首次突破 1000 亿元大关。而从 1000 亿到 2000 亿，仅用了一年半的时间(2002
年 8 月～2004 年 3 月)。第三个 1000 亿，甚至只用了四个月时间(2004 年 3 月～
2004 年 7 月)。从 2004 年 7 月以来的这一年多时间里，基金资产规模连续跨越





行为。根据《基金黑幕》作者的观察，从 1999 年 8 月 9 日到 12 月 3 日的 80 个交
易日中，同一家基金管理公司管理多家基金进行同一只股票的同时增仓、减仓或
有增有减所涉及的股票有 76 只，自身对倒的 7 只，基金间双向倒仓的 11 只。②2001
年 12 月，47 只基金违规巨额申购“深高速”股票，申报数量竟然达到 288.65 亿股，
超过最大申报量的 12.5 倍。在 2004 年 7 月联通的配售中，5 家由承销商控股的
基金管理公司所管理的基金放弃了所拥有的中国联通的配售权，1.6 亿股遭到弃
配，损失 7200 万元。而根据包销的原则，这 7200 万元被承销商收入囊中。在
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2004 年新爆的基金黑幕中，基金经理的“新花样”又被曝光，例如“监守自盗”，即
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第一章  证券投资基金概述 
 
























                                                        









































                                                        
① 何孝星，主编．证券投资基金管理学[M]．辽宁：东北财经大学出版社，2004．4． 
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